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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
C. ED LEWIS COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MIKE S. DRAGOS, . 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I 
Case No. 
8072 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All citations referred to herein·refer to the transcript 
records, the numbering of which appears in red. 
This lawsuit is brought for damages against the de-
fendant and respondent, Mike Dragos, for the loss of plain-
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tiff's brokerage fee for the sale of that certain real prop-
erty described in the listing contract (Exhibit P-1), where-
in one Ted Russell and his wife, Manilla Russell, listed for 
sale with the plaintiff and appellant, for the sale price of 
$66,000.00. During the term Qf the listing, the plaintiff 
and appellant obtained a purchaser therefor, one Ralph 
Brimhall, who agreed to pay $55,000.00 therefor and who 
paid $1,000.00 as earnest money to the said plaintiff and 
- appellant, and the said Russells agreed to accept said sum 
of $55,000.00. ~The, said Ralph Brimhall was and is, at all 
times, able, ready, and willing to pay to the said Ted Russell 
and his wife the sum of $55,000.00 (R. p. 15, L. 25; R. p. 
31, L. 23-27; R. p. 65, L. 16-20). After paying the $1,000.00 
down to the plaintiff, the said Ralph Brimhall went to the 
said real property to look it over and while there, on the 
4th day of September, 1952, saw the defendant, Mike S. 
Dragos, and had a conversation with him. During said 
conversation the defendant and respondent pointed out to 
the said Brimhall the line which he claimed as his boundary 
line, which line ran approximately sixteen inches under the 
cabins owned by the said Ted Russell and his wife (R. p. 
67; R. p. 68, L. 1-8), and informed the said purchaser, 
Ralph Brimhall, that he would require $3,000.00 for his 
property which extended under said cabins (R. p. 68). 
The saiQ Ralph Brimhall, on learning of the claim of the 
defendant and respondent, Mike Dragos, informed the 
11111111 
-plaintiff .and, appellant that he did not desire to purchase 
trouble and therefore informed the plaintiff and appellant 
that the deal was off. 
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On the 19th day of November, 1951, the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in the case of Dragos et ux 
v. Russell et ux, Civil No. 7568, and therein reversed the 
decision of the lower court, Judge Baker, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, and remanded the case for the 
following purposes : 
"However, it cannot be ascertained with cer-
tainty, just how much or what portion of the de-
fendants' sewer line is on the defendant's property. 
The case should be reversed and remanded. Addi-
tional evidence should be taken to determine what 
description is necessary to fix the boundary be-
tween the lots of the parties so that the new line 
correctly coincides with the fence line which is 
conclusively shown to be north of the cabins. (Ital-
ics ours.) 
Judge Baker took additional evidence as to where the 
boundary line was to be, disregarding the Supreme Court's 
decision that the boundary line was the old fence line and 
that appeal was taken to the Supreme Court on the 20th 
day of August, 1952, as Civil No. 7895. 
Plaintiff filed its complaint (R. p. 1) ; defendant filed 
his answer (R. p. 2) ; defendant filed his motion to dismiss 
(R. p. 4), which the court denied. The issues were joined. 
The trial was had during the week of May 6, 1953. 
The action was tried before the Honorable A. H. Ellett 
and judgment of no cause of action was entered against the 
plaintiff on the 18th day of May, 1953. The plaintiff, on 
the 21st day of May, 1953, filed its objections to the pro-
posed findings and filed its own proposed findings of fact 
(R. p. 122). The court rejected the plaintiff's proposed 
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findings and entered its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law (R. p. 118). 
The appellant has appealed. from the judgment of the 
court of no cause of action, and the whole thereof. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING NO. 3 AND THE EVI-
DENCE IS CONTRARY TO SAID FINDING. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING NO.4 IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISIONS AFTER THAT ENTER-
ED BY THIS, THE SUPREME COURT, IN 
THE CASE DRAGOS ET UX V. RUSSELL ET 
UX,. NO. 7568 (R. 43, 44, and 47). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING NO. 3 AND THE EVI-
DENCE IS CONTRARY TO SAID FINDING. 
There is no substantial evidence in the record to sup-
port the court's finding that the defendant, Mike Dragos, 
never made any misrepresentations of fact as to where 
the boundary line existed between the property of Ted 
Russell and himself. It is the contention of the appellant 
that he did make misrepresentations to the said Ralph 
Brimhall as t~ where the line was. Said Ralph Brimhall 
went to see the property of the said Ted Russell on or 
about the 4th day of September, 1952 (R. p. 66, L. 28) 
and there had a conversation with the defendant Dragos. 
During the conversation Dragos pointed to a concrete brick 
lying on the ground and pointed out to the said Ralph 
Brimhall that his line ran due east and west from where 
that brick was lying (R. p. 67, L. 16) and that the said 
line as pointed out by Dragos ran sixteen inches under the 
cabins owned by the said Russell (R. p. 68) and claimed 
that he, Dragos, was the owner of the property north of 
said line to the extent of sixteen inches and that_he wanted 
from $3,000.00 to $5,000.00 for that if Mr. Brimhall bought 
the property (R. p. 68). 
The said Brimhall was able, ready, and willing to buy 
the said property from the said Russell through the plain-
tiff and had agreed to pay the sum of $55,000.00 therefor,· 
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which the said Ted Russell had agreed to receive (R. p. 
15, L. 25; R. p. 31, L. 23-27; R. p. 65, L. 16-20). Brimhall 
wanted to buy this property upon which the cabins stood, 
but stated in the record that when he discovered that the 
defendant Dragos claimed to own sixteen inches under the 
cabins, that he didn't want to buy trouble (R. p. 68, L. 8). 
There is no substantial evidence in the entire record 
of the defendant Dragos or any of his witnesses, refuting 
or disputing the testimony of Ralph Brimhall, sufficient 
to support the court's finding. Neither did he attack the 
testimony of Ralph Brimhall in the record. It is true that 
Dragos, on the stand, said he had never seen Brimhall, but 
such statement was not credible, and the court said he did 
not believe Dragos. 
In a law case tried to a court without a jury, it is the 
duty of the appellate court to determine whether or not 
there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding. 
The case of Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 Utah 174, in re-
gard to the right of the Supreme Court to determine 
whether or not evidence is substantial and sufficient· to 
sustain a finding, the court said: 
"But, as we have already pointed out, where a 
defense or a complete right of action depends upon 
diverse elements, it is the duty of every reviewing 
court, when proper assignments are made and in-
sisted upon, to scrutinize the evidence, and from 
it determine whether there is some substan_tial evi-
dence in support of every essential element. In 
doing that the court is neither weighing the evi· 
dence nor passing upon the credibility of the wit-
nesses, but is merely discharging the duty imposed 
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upon it by law. Of course, the easy thing to do 
would be to follow the findings of the trial court or 
jury, whatever they may be. If we merely consulted 
our own inclinations, and if we recognized no higher 
duty than to follow the course of least resistance, 
we should in every case abide by the findings of 
the lower courts or juries. Whenever, in our j udg-
ment, there is some substantial evidence, either 
direct or inferential, in support of every element 
which is necessary to sustain the judgment, and 
there are no errors of law, we unhesitatingly affirm 
the judgment. We, however, should as unhesitating-
ly refuse to affirm where, in our judgment, there 
is no substantial evidence in support of one or more 
essential elements constituting the cause of action. 
While upon questions of fact we may not substi-
tute our judgment for that of the jury or trial 
court, yet upon the question of whether there is 
any substantial evidence in support of a particular 
fact or element we may not permit the trial court 
or jury to substitute their judgment for ours. In 
arriving at a conclusion in that regard we must, as 
a matter of course, abide by our own judgment and 
understanding.'' 
See also the case of Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 
79 P. 2d 77. 
In Volume 40, page 500, of Words and Phrases, it is 
stated: 
"Test of 'substantial evidence' as respects right 
of defendant to reversal on ground that verdict is 
not supported by evidence is whether jury reason-
ably could find issue thereon. 'Substantial evidence' 
is more than evidence which, if true, would have 
probative force on issues, and must amount to more 
than scintilla and constitute evidence on which jury 
could without acting unreasonably decide in favor 
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of plaintiff or party producing it; evidence favoring 
facts which is such that reasonable men may fairly 
differ as to whether it establishes them. State v. 
Gregory, 96 S. W. 2d 47, 51, 52, 339 Mo. 133." 
And further: 
"'Substantial evidence' sufficient to meet 'pre-
sumption' or prima facie case implies that it must 
be credible. Hildebrand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 
17 P. 2d 651, 654, 45 Wyo. 175." 
Then the question arises whether or not Mike Dragos 
introduced any "substantial evidence" sufficient for the 
court to base its findings that he had not made any mis-
representations to Brimhall, which caused the said Brimhall 
to refuse to purchase the said land of Ted Russell. By the 
test aforesaid, the Hildebrand case, supra, held that the evi-
dence must be credible .. At the close of the defendant's case 
the. court stated that he did not believe the defendant Dragos 
or his wife, but that it was unnecessary to believe them, as 
Dragos was entitled to rely on the subsequent decision of 
Judge Baker. However, at most,' Dragos' testimony that he 
had never seen Ralph Brimhall, a mere denial, is self-serv-
ing, whereas the testimony of Ralph Brimhall was that of a 
disinterested witness and the whole record of the testimony 
of Dragos, on direct and cross-examination, indicates that 
the testimony of the defendant Dragos was incredible. Too, 
the plaintiff's witness Robertson, who went to the property 
on or about the 20th day of October, 1952, stated thatDragos 
declared that Russell's cabins were on his (Dragos) prop-
erty (R. p. 53, L. 14-30; R. p. 54, L. 1-13). The plaintiff, 
as well as Russell, both testified that defendant Dragos 
claimed the property under the buildings of the said Rus-
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sell. The trial court could not and did not give credence 
to the testimony of the defendant Dragos wherein he stated 
he had never seen the witness Ralph Brimhall. 
The case of Dragos et ux v. Russell et ux, Supreme 
Court No. 7568, decided unequivocally where the boundary 
line was between the said properties and that the said line 
was north of the cabins owned by the said Ted Russell 
and his wife and that, therefore, when the defendant Dragos 
made the statement to said Brimhall that the line ran some 
sixteen inches under the said cabins, it was false and untrue. 
and made with the intention to obstruct the sale of said 
property to the said Brimhall by the said Ted Russell 
through the plaintiff. The said opinion of this court in 
said action was prior to time to said misrepresentation. 
This point will be more fully discussed under Point No. II. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT'S FINDING NO. 4 IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
No.4 of the court's findings is contrary to law because 
the court therein determined that the boundary line be-
tween the defendant Dragos and the said Ted Russell had 
never been established. On the 19th day of November, 1951, 
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case 
of Dragos et ux v. Russell et ux, Civil No. 7568, and therein 
reversed the decision of the lower court, Judge Baker, in 
the Third Judicial District Court, and remanded the ·case 
for the following purposes: 
"However, it cannot be ascertained with cer-
tainty, just how much or what portion of the defend-
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ants' sewer line is on the defendants' property. The 
case should be reversed and remanded. Additional 
evidence should be taken to determine what descrip .. 
tion is necessary to fix the boundary between the 
lots of the parties so that the new line correctly 
coincides with the fence line which is conclusively 
shf!wn to be north of the cabins" (Italics ours). 
Judge Baker took additional evidence as to where the 
boundary line was to be, disregarding the Supreme Court's 
decision that the boundary line was the old fence line and 
that appeal was taken to the Supreme Court on the 20th 
day of August, 1952, as Civil No. 7895. 
Plaintiff contends that the boundary line had been 
I -
established and Dragos was bound thereby and that the 
court had notice that it had been so established by Exhibit 
P -3, a part of the record, which had been accepted in evi-
dence. The court misconstrued the Supreme Court decision, 
as is indicated by the court's statement. Judge Ellett stated 
that the defendant Dragos had the right to fuss over where 
that boundary was because the Supreme Court said "it is 
where the old fence line was" and they said "we can't tell 
where the old fence was." Plaintiff and appellant submits 
that this is not in accord with the Supreme Court's decision 
in case No. 7568. This court had determined that the bound-
ary line was the old fence line ; that a tree was growing on 
the old fence line, which line was north of the cabins. 
The trial court further stated in the record that the sub· 
sequent decision of Judge Baker, which was then appealed 
from to the Supreme Court as Civil No. 7895, permited the 
defendant Dragos to rely upon that decision and justify 
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him in his opinion that the boundary· line ·had not been de-
termined. Plaintiff and appellant submits that Judge Baker 
as bound by the original decision of this court in Case No. 
7568, and could not re-try the matter of the boundary line. 
He was limited only to the purpose of the remand, to .. wit: to 
take additional evidence to determine what description was 
necessary to fix the boundary between the lots of the par-
ties, so that the new line (to-wit, the old fence line) "cor-
rectly coincides with the fence line which is conclusively 
shown to be north of the cabins" and to determine what 
portion of the Russell sewer line was on the Dragos prop-
erty, if any. 
In support of Judge Baker's order now before the 
Supreme Court, as Civil No. 7895, Judge Baker's Finding 
No. 3 is as follows: 
"That on or about the month of August, 1943, 
the defendants began the construction of a motel 
and began to erect on the northerly part of their 
lot a number of cabins, said cabins being built of 
cinder blocks, wood, and cement, and on the north 
side of said cabins, defendants have installed a 
sewer pipe line; that said construction of said build-
ing was close to the boundary line of plaintiffs' and 
defendants' lots and that a portion of said cabins 
and sewer line projected .. over and onto the plain-
tiffs' lot, beginning from one inch to approximately 
three feet in an easterly and westerly direction on 
the southern portion of the above described premises 
belonging to the plaintiffs, and defendants com-
pleted said construction and cabins on or about 
August, 1948." 
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The order based upon said finding determined the 
boundary line as being: 
"Beginning at a point North 0°01'30" East 
65~06 feet and South 89° 55' West 33 feet from the 
Southwest corner of Lot 15, Block 33, Ten Acre 
Plat 'A', Big Field Survey, and running South 89° 
55' West 165 feet; thence North 89°36'52" West 
330.002 feet." 
The original description in t~e Dragos deed, according 
to plaintiff Dragos' complaint, was : 
"Beginning at a point 65.06 feet North of the 
Southwest corner of Lot 15, Block 33, Ten Acre 
Plat 'A', Big Field Survey, and running thence 
North 66 feet; thence West 495 feet ; thence South 
66 feet; thence East 495 feet to beginning." 
The final order of Judge ·Baker in said action definitely 
places the boundary line under the. cabins of the defendants 
Russell and his wife, and the same is contrary to the re-
mand and mandate of the Supreme Court. 
If Judge Baker considered the said decision of this 
court to be ambiguous and he could not understand what 
the court required, he could not discard the said decision 
of the Supreme Court and take other evidence upon the 
matters I already determined by the Supreme Court, but it 
was his duty to make application to the Supreme Court for 
further explanation. (See Appeal and Error, 5 C. J. S. 
1494, Note 13, and the cases cited thereunder.) 
In In re Crawford's Estate, 169 A. 438, 331 Pa. 127, 
the court said : 
"When an order of the supreme court is mis-
understood or is not sufficiently clear, the proper 
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practice is to petition the supreme court to clarify 
the order." 
Appellant insists that Judge Baker, the trial court, 
could not re-hear or reconsider the matters decided by the 
appellate court and it was the duty of the lower court to 
follow the decision of the supreme court. 
"The lower court cannot rehear or decide mat-
ters decided by the appellate court.'' Louisville Fire 
Brick Works v. Tackett, 288 S. W. 665. 
Appellant insists that the "law of the case" applies as it 
is set out in Appeal and Error, 5 C. J. S. p. 1501, Sec. 1964, 
where the doctrine is digested as follows: 
"The lower court cannot rehear or reconsider 
the matters decided by the appellate court, and it is 
the duty of the lower court to follow the decision of 
the appellate court, its action being deemed erron-
eous when at variance with the decision." 
Cases to support the above are cited in Notes 68, 69 
and 70., 
This court, in the case of Helper State Bank v. Crus, 
81 P. 2d 359, syllabus 1, said : 
"It is a well-established rule in this jurisdiction, 
as well as in a majority of other jurisdictions, that 
where the questions of law and fact are the same 
the decision of the first appeal, whether right or 
wrong, becomes the law of the case on second ap-
peal and is binding as well on the parties to the 
action, the trial court, and the appellate court." 
And cites many cases therein. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
It is further stated in 5 C. J. S. pp. 1501-1502, Sec. 
1964: 
"The rule is that matters once determined by 
the appellate court cannot, after remand,. be again 
raised and relitigated in the lower court." 
The cases cited in support of that are shown in Note 
72. This is exactly what Judge Baker endeavored to do in 
his second case, to-wit, re-determine the boundary line, 
which is appealed to this court as Case No. 7895. 
Appellant maintains that if Judge Baker in such sub-
sequent case could not reconsider the question of the bound-
ary line as previously determined by this court, then the 
defendant Dragos could not rely upon Judge Baker's de-
cision, nor have reasonable grounds to make a statement to 
Ralph Brimhall that he owned the ground under the cabins 
owned by the said Ted Russell and his wife, and having 
made said statement, it was false as of the date that it 
was made and, being false, and the said Ralph Brimhall 
having refused to purchase the said property from said Ted 
Russell, the plaintiff and appellant should therefore be en-
titled to recover its commission. Furthermore, the state-
ment made by the trial court in this case that the said 
Dragos had a right to fuss over the boundary line was not 
according to law (R. p. 78, L. 20). 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
QUESTIONS REGARDIN,G THE TRIAL 
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COURT'S DECISIONS AFTER THAT ENTER-
ED BY THIS, THE SUPREME COURT, IN 
THE CASE DRAGOS ET UX V. RUSSELL ET 
UX, NO. 7568 (R. 43, 44, and 47). 
The court erred in overruling plaintiff's objection to 
questions asked Mr. Russell on cross-examination (R. p. 
43, L. 18) : 
"Q. So last year we had two or three hearings 
in this court again? 
"A. In regards to what? 
"Q. In regards to the fence line, where the 
location of the fence line was to be? 
"A. y es. 
"Q. All right, and various orders were made 
about the fence line and the sewer line. Isn't that 
right?" 
Plaintiff objected to those questions on the. grounds 
that the court had received in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit 
3 and therefore the foregoing questions were not the best 
evidence, as Exhibit No. 3 was the best evidence. The ob-
jection was by the court overruled (R. p. 43, L. 30). 
Adopting the argument in Point No. II, appellant main-
tains that all subsequent decisions by Judge Baker and here-
in referred to by counsel for the defendant had no effect 
whatsoever in law and therefore it was objectionable for 
the court to permit questions to be asked about such sub-
sequent decisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that there is no substantial 
evidence to support the verdict and that said verdict is 
contrary to law and that the same should be reversed and 
remanded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN, 
GLEN Y. RICHARDS, 
JENSEN & RICHARDS 
1414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
A tto14neys for Appellant. 
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